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In Globalization and Global Justice, Nicole Hassoun presents a new and 
fundamental challenge to libertarian political thought. Her Legitimacy 
Argument tries to show that natural rights libertarians are committed by 
their own principles to a requirement that their states recognize and meet 
the positive welfare rights of certain merely potentially autonomous persons. 
Unfortunately, this argument suffers from two flaws. Hassoun needs to show, 
but has not shown, that the libertarian state would have to infringe any of 
the negative rights of the merely potentially autonomous in such a way as 
to require consent from them. Moreover, the libertarians could arrange their 
institutions, justifiably by their own lights, so as to expel all indigent, merely 
potentially autonomous persons from their territory. This second solution is 
intuitively unpalatable, but may be no more morally problematic than the 
basic natural rights libertarian view itself.
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE LEGITIMACY ARGUMENT
Much recent work on global justice has focused on attempts to convince 
libertarians that the processes of globalization generate significant obligations 
to help the global poor. The work of Thomas Pogge and others towards this 
goal has recently been supplemented by Nicole Hassoun’s important book 
Globalization and Global Justice. Hassoun presents a new, fundamental, and 
apparently devastating challenge to libertarian political thought. According 
to Hassoun’s Legitimacy Argument, natural rights libertarians who reject 
anarchism, defend the state’s monopoly on force, and accept actual consent 
theory, cannot explain how it is morally legitimate for them to coerce certain 
non-autonomous but potentially autonomous persons. In order for a 
libertarian state to exercise jurisdiction over these persons, it must provide 
them, insofar as it can, with what they need to become autonomous. Thus 
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the normative legitimacy of even a libertarian state would depend on its 
practical recognition of certain positive welfare rights.
Hassoun focuses our attention, as other writers have, on the horrifying 
moral tragedy of our time: the plight of the global poor in a world that 
contains so much affluence. Libertarians are aware of this tragedy, and have 
no need to minimize it. They propose to relieve the misery of the poor by 
extending free trade, the rule of law, and the institutions of capitalist society 
to every part of the globe. Since these institutions have repeatedly succeeded 
where no others have in transforming poor countries into rich countries, 
they constitute the only approach on which we have any reason to rely for 
saving the world’s poor from their wretched condition. 
Hassoun would disagree with this program; and she offers various 
empirical arguments for the importance of foreign aid in helping to alleviate 
global poverty. But regardless of the outcome of the empirical debate about 
what measures would most effectively help the poor, libertarians must 
still contend with Hassoun’s case for the claim that, contrary to their view, 
potentially autonomous people have positive welfare rights that can be 
grounded in considerations about individual freedom and consent that 
libertarians themselves accept, and that governments cannot be legitimate 
if they do not appropriately respond to these rights.
Libertarians advocate the creation of minimal states that do nothing 
other than protect the negative rights of their citizens. Such states would 
have police forces, courts, and armies, and would use them to punish 
crime, deter aggression and enforce contracts, but would not collect 
taxes from citizens for any other purpose beyond these. Call a minimal 
political institution of this type a libertarian state. Those who claim that 
only a libertarian state would be legitimate, because any more extensive 
state would violate the natural rights of citizens, I will call natural rights 
libertarians (see Nozick 1977).
Two prominent theorists, Thomas Pogge and James Sterba, have 
attempted to show that the natural rights libertarian position, as just 
explained, is unstable: under contemporary conditions, their view should 
imply stringent, enforceable duties to help the global poor. For example, 
Pogge draws on the Lockean understanding of property rights to try to show 
that unless we provide the global poor with considerably more resources 
than they now possess, we will be violating their negative rights (Pogge 2002: 
208-9). Sterba claims that by enforcing property rights, the libertarian state 
violates the poor’s right to take what they need to survive; this conflict of 
rights should be resolved in favor of a duty to aid (Sterba 2005: 47-48). But, as 
Hassoun points out, libertarians have been unconvinced by these arguments. 
Some “reject Sterba’s conclusion because they do not believe that a conflict 
of rights generates a duty to aid the poor”. Others have tried to show “that 
libertarians are likely to reject Pogge’s baseline for harm”. (Hassoun 2012: 
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91). Thus, the arguments of Pogge and Sterba remain controversial. Hassoun 
therefore proposes her own, new argument, which attempts to show in an 
entirely different way that the basic moral principles that underlie natural 
rights libertarianism should, properly understood, require institutions that 
redistribute resources towards the poor. Although this argument is framed 
in ways that address the global poor, the core of the argument is applicable 
to a single libertarian state. Thus, despite the fact that Hassoun’s book as a 
whole is directed to addressing issues of global justice, I will be focusing on 
her argument primarily as it applies domestically.
On p. 92 of Globalization and Global Justice, Hassoun states her 
Legitimacy Argument as follows: 1
(1) Coercive institutions must be legitimate.
(2)  Roughly, for a coercive institution to be legitimate it must ensure that 
its subjects secure sufficient autonomy to autonomously consent to, 
or dissent from, its rules (henceforth sufficient autonomy.)
(3)  Everyone, to secure this autonomy, must secure some food and 
water, and most require some shelter, education, health care, social 
support, and emotional goods.
(4)  There are many coercive international institutions.
(C)  So, these institutions must (roughly) ensure that their subjects 
secure food, water, and whatever else they need for autonomy.
I will not be questioning any of premises 1, 3, or 4. Premise 1 is accepted, in 
some form, by nearly everyone. Premises 3 and 4 look like straightforward 
empirical truths. So what supports premise 2? 2
According to Hassoun, natural rights libertarians should accept actual 
consent theory: they should hold that coercive institutions are legitimate 
only if those subject to them have actually consented to their rule. She 
persuasively argues that the standard objections against actual consent 
theory should not be acceptable to libertarians. So a libertarian minimal 
state must secure the actual consent of autonomous persons that live on 
its territory. But what about those who are merely potentially autonomous, 
such as children, or the curably mentally ill? They are still subject to the 
coercive force of the law of a libertarian state. In order for the state to be 
1. The “Legitimacy Argument”, as discussed here, is a form of the more general Autonomy 
Argument that has been adapted to apply to libertarian theories. Although Hassoun believes, 
and attempts to show in her Chapter 2, that all persons, whether autonomous or not, do have 
positive welfare rights, the intention of the Legitimacy Argument is to show specifically that, 
even on purely libertarian assumptions, persons who are merely potentially autonomous 
would have positive welfare rights against a libertarian state.
2. Premise 2 starts with the word “roughly”. Hassoun explains the qualifications to this 
premise that she thinks are necessary at 93-94. They involve those who do not respect the rights 
of others; those who can never become autonomous; and those who somehow give up their 
right to consent. None of these qualifications will be relevant to the argument of this paper.
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justified in infringing their rights through coercion, Hassoun argues, it must 
do what is necessary to get their actual consent. But since these merely 
potentially autonomous individuals do not presently have the normative 
capacity to grant valid consent, so long as they remain as they are, the state 
cannot get what it needs from them. So it is morally required to provide 
them with whatever they need in order to become autonomous, so that 
they can eventually consent to its rule. This Legitimacy Argument would, 
then, require that the curably mentally ill should receive treatment at public 
expense, and that children should have their basic needs met and should 
be provided publicly with sufficient education to become autonomous. 
Since these goods and services will be paid for from taxation, the Legitimacy 
Argument entails that citizens of a minimal libertarian state have robust 
positive duties towards the merely potentially autonomous; should these 
duties not be fulfilled, their state becomes normatively illegitimate.
To derive premise 2 from actual consent theory, Hassoun needs the 
plausible assumption that even a libertarian state would have to employ 
coercion against those living in its territory, including those who are only 
potentially autonomous. But how, exactly, would the libertarian state 
use coercion against merely potentially autonomous citizens? When we 
separately examine the various rights that non-autonomous persons might 
have, we can identify what may be a serious flaw in this argument. 
2.  FIRST REPLY: THE RIGHTS OF THE MERELY POTENTIALLY 
AUTONOMOUS
For present purposes, we can say that, from the kind of libertarian perspective 
we are examining, individuals have natural rights to bodily integrity, 
property, self-defense, and punishment. The right to bodily integrity is 
a trivial consequence of the basic libertarian premise of self-ownership. 
Rights to property are the result of the appropriation of unowned natural 
objects and their transformation through labor. Various widely accepted and 
uncontroversial human rights, such as rights to free speech, free association, 
due process in criminal cases, and so on, are seen by libertarians as flowing 
from these two more basic rights to bodily integrity and property. The 
other two basic natural rights authorize responses to rights violations by 
others. The right to self-defense gives us limited permissions to respond to 
violations that are occurring in the present or are likely to occur in the future; 
the right to punish gives us limited permissions to respond to violations that 
have occurred in the past. 
There is no clear reason why a libertarian state would have to commit 
aggression against non-rights-violating potentially autonomous persons in 
its territory, depriving them of their rights to bodily integrity. Nor would the 
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libertarian state arbitrarily confiscate their property. But there is a problem 
about whether it would be permitted to ask the merely potentially autonomous 
to pay for its protective services, since they are unable to give valid consent to 
the contract that authorizes payment for such services. Of course, the citizens 
of such a state could agree to offer protective services to the potentially 
autonomous for free. In the case of merely potentially autonomous people 
who have no valuable resources, this may be the only option. But for those 
merely potentially autonomous citizens who own some resources, perhaps 
through inheritance or gift, another approach may be available.
Since they choose to pay the fee for protection, the autonomous citizens 
of the libertarian state apparently consider that the benefits they receive 
from this protection outweigh the costs. This is not because of idiosyncratic 
preferences on their part. The human need for protection against violence 
is as widely shared as the needs for shelter and food. Thus, we can safely 
be confident that, if potentially autonomous people receive protection from 
the state at the expense of being required to pay for it, they will benefit, on 
net, from the exchange. So perhaps the state can coerce them to pay taxes, 
or require their guardians to pay taxes on their behalf and out of their 
property, for paternalistic reasons. Obviously libertarians protest vigorously 
against paternalist coercion directed against rational adults; but it should be 
almost equally obvious that libertarians are not required by the logic of their 
position to reject the paternalist coercion of small children, animals, or other 
non-autonomous or merely potentially autonomous beings with interests. 
Hassoun restricts her argument to libertarian views that do not make it easy 
to justify coercion of the potentially autonomous for the benefit of others 
(90,) but that restriction does not rule out views that allow coercing such 
persons for their own benefit. I conclude from these considerations that, in 
requiring those potentially autonomous beings on their territory who own 
valuable resources to contribute some of those resources to the defense of 
their society from violence, the libertarians would not wrong those beings.
Would the libertarian state need to take away the potentially autonomous 
inhabitants’ right to self-defense? It’s not clear why it would. Most likely, 
citizens of a libertarian state who had the appropriate cognitive and physical 
abilities would retain a robust right to defend themselves against actually 
occurring violent attacks, especially in emergencies when the police or 
other agents of the state happen not to be present. Some individuals who 
lacked the capacity for full autonomy might, in spite of their immaturity or 
cognitive impairments, still be capable of accurately perceiving that they 
were under violent attack and of defending themselves in a proportionate 
manner. The libertarian state could recognize the right to self-defense of 
both its autonomous and non-autonomous citizens in the same way. Of 
course there might be some inhabitants of the state’s territory who are so 
young, or so gravely mentally impaired, that they are unable to recognize 
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when they are under attack, or to assess the seriousness of the attack so as 
to be able to respond in a reliably proportionate way. But, libertarians could 
argue, those non-autonomous individuals don’t have a right to self-defense, 
and so the libertarian state can’t be accused of depriving them of any right by 
forbidding them to defend themselves.
That leaves only the right to punish as a potential source of Hassoun’s 
moral criticism. The libertarian state would insist on requiring all inhabitants 
of its territory to surrender the individual right to punish that, according 
to natural rights theory, they would have had in the state of nature, and 
providing them instead with a claim to impartial justice as administered 
by its courts. It’s primarily for this reason that the natural rights libertarian 
position is not a form of anarchism. But why is it permissible to take 
away, without consent, the right to punish held by the merely potentially 
autonomous? This deprivation can’t be justified on paternalist grounds. 
When the libertarian state requires a specific individual to surrender her 
right to punish, the motivation for doing so is not primarily to benefit that 
individual herself, but rather to protect others from the consequences of 
being punished by her in a biased or disproportionate manner. So if the 
merely potentially autonomous have a right to punish at all, then depriving 
them of it poses a serious moral problem. But do they?
Locke would have said, I think, that they do not. To have a right to punish 
in a Lockean state of nature, a being must be capable of knowing the law of 
nature and of administering punishment in a proportionate manner. Thus 
Locke writes that a man in the state of nature has 
no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in 
his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy 
of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and 
conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his transgression, which 
is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint (Locke 1982: II.8. 
Emphasis in original).
To exercise this limited power of punishment, someone would seem to need 
those faculties which Locke calls “calm reason and conscience”. Indeed, the 
proper use of punishment by a being in the state of nature would seem to 
require a fairly sophisticated deployment of rationality. Locke writes that 
“each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity 
as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to 
repent, and terrify others from doing the like” (Locke 1982: II.2). Some might 
question whether an adult of ordinary intelligence, or even a panel of experts 
on criminology, would be able to do a good job of ascertaining the correct 
punishment for a particular offense, on this conception. But Locke, defending 
his conception of the law of nature as including a scale of appropriate 
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punishments, insists that “it is certain there is such a law, and that too, as 
intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of that law, as the 
positive laws of commonwealths, nay possibly plainer...” (Locke 1982: II.12). 
However plausible or implausible this may be, Locke surely could not have 
claimed, without recourse to innate ideas or other views that he explicitly 
denied, that a human who has not yet become rational would nevertheless 
be able to know this law. And if you can’t know, even approximately, what 
punishments it would be appropriate to administer, you can’t have or claim 
a right to punish others, even if they encroach upon your undoubted rights. 3
When the right to punish is understood in this Lockean way, it is unclear 
that there would ever be a case of someone who was merely potentially 
autonomous, in the sense of being insufficiently rational to have the 
normative power to consent to the authority of the state, who would yet 
be sufficiently rational in certain specific respects so as to have a right to 
punish. Nevertheless, suppose that, in rare cases, this condition is met. 
Someone meeting this condition who was deprived of the right to punish 
by a libertarian state would be no more wronged than an unusually mature 
and responsible fifteen-year-old who is denied the right to drive a car in 
today’s society. A libertarian state could reasonably expect the ability to 
make a rational assessment about proportionate punishment to be strongly 
correlated with the measurable aspects of rationality that it takes to be 
sufficient evidence of the normative power to consent to the authority of 
the state. The state must draw a line somewhere; if the line is defensible on 
its own terms, then despite the elements of arbitrariness in its construction, 
those on the “may not punish” side of the line are not wronged by it.
If these Lockean views, or some modernized version of them, turn out 
to be defensible, then Hassoun will be unable to support premise 2 of her 
Legitimacy Argument. It is clear that a libertarian state would sometimes 
have to use coercion against merely potentially autonomous persons. 
However, in doing so, this state could defensibly claim that it would not 
violate or take away any of their rights. In dealing with merely potentially 
autonomous persons living on its territory, the libertarian state would 
not take away their rights to person or to self-defense. It could take some 
of their property to pay for its protective services, but this can be given 
an acceptable moral justification; and the state would not invade their 
property rights in any other problematic way. If the merely potentially 
3. Recent scholarship on Locke reaches conclusions about what the natural right to 
punishment requires that are consistent with the claims I make in this paragraph. See, for 
example, Ward, 2009: 233: “The problems Locke identified in the state of nature are inextricably 
connected to the natural power to punish, which places a heavy cognitive burden on the 
private judgment of individuals who are expected to resist the impulses of excessive self-love 
and perform ex tempore highly complex moral reasoning related to difficult questions about 
reparation, restraint, deterrence, and mutual assistance”.
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autonomous persons did have a right to punish, the libertarian state would 
have to take it away, and this would be difficult to justify; but since, at least 
in general and in typical cases, they have no such right, there is no charge 
to answer.
However, if the libertarian state would not, in coercing the merely 
potentially autonomous, ever have to violate their rights, then it would 
not need to obtain their consent. And if it would not need to obtain their 
consent, it would not need to provide them with the goods and services they 
would need to become autonomous. Hassoun has good reason to claim 
that libertarian theory implies that a libertarian state would need to get the 
consent of all autonomous persons subject to its laws; but she cannot claim 
the same thing about merely potentially autonomous persons. So premise 
2 does not follow from actual consent theory; and no other justification for 
premise 2 has been provided. 4
3. SECOND REPLY: EXPULSION
Suppose that I am wrong about this issue, and that Hassoun can find a way 
to show convincingly either that there are merely potentially autonomous 
persons who nevertheless retain a right to punish, or that the libertarian 
state would, for some other reason, be morally required to get the consent 
of the merely potentially autonomous. Libertarians will still have another 
way to reject premise 2, and thereby, to resist the Legitimacy Argument. 
This second strategy may not be very appealing, but it strikes me as being 
in accord with the basic normative logic of the overall libertarian position. 
To understand it, let’s begin to think through some details of the kind of 
situation Hassoun’s argument must be invoking.
Of the potentially autonomous persons living in a libertarian state, some 
will have family members who love them and have the desire and capacity 
to provide them with what they need to become fully autonomous. Since 
their needs are being met, they pose no special moral problem for the 
libertarian state. Other potentially autonomous persons will have resources 
of their own, perhaps obtained through inheritance or through their own 
labor, with which they can purchase what they need in order to become fully 
autonomous. Again, they pose no special moral problem. So the people we 
need to concern ourselves with are obviously those who do not have, and 
4. Note that a non-libertarian state or international institution would coerce its citizens 
in many more ways, and for many more reasons, than a libertarian state would. Therefore the 
reply I have offered on behalf of the libertarians wouldn’t be available to defenders of such 
a state. As a result, the objection I have been pressing does not cast doubt on the validity of 
Hassoun’s Autonomy Argument (45) as applied to coercive international institutions designed 
on a non-libertarian basis.
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cannot obtain through legal, private voluntary transactions, the resources 
necessary to meet their needs. Let’s say, then, that Annie is a young and 
impoverished orphan, trying to survive in a libertarian utopia.
Almost all of the land in the libertarian society will be privately owned. 
The only exceptions would be facilities associated with the state’s legitimate 
protective role, such as police stations, courts, and military bases. It would 
not be difficult to justify refusing to let Annie stay in these facilities. If the 
society’s military bases and police stations were transformed into homeless 
shelters, those structures would no longer be able to carry out their rights-
protective functions effectively. So libertarians would be on firm ground in 
claiming that, if Annie is going to live in the libertarian state, she’ll have to 
stay on private property.
Would it be permissible, though, for a property owner to allow Annie 
to stay on his land, but without providing her with what she needs in 
order to grow up and become autonomous? Before considering Hassoun’s 
arguments, we might have thought so. But if we adopt Hassoun’s view, it 
will now turn out that by giving Annie permission to stay on his land, the 
property owner in question is consenting to a situation whose moral result 
will be the existence of an obligation, binding on his fellow libertarian 
citizens, to provide Annie with resources. This is because, once the property 
owner gives Annie permission to stay on his land, she will be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the libertarian state; as a result, according to Hassoun, she 
will have positive welfare rights, which the property owner’s neighbors will 
have to pay for. In allowing Annie to stay on his land, and thereby creating 
a situation in which his fellow citizens acquire positive duties, the property 
owner is arguably violating their negative rights by imposing costs on them 
without their permission.
Given that allowing Annie to stay would violate other citizens’ rights, 
it would be legitimate for the citizens of the libertarian state to make an 
agreement, perhaps at the constitutional convention that establishes their 
form of government, restricting the ability of landowners to harbor indigent 
potentially autonomous persons such as Annie. According to the agreement 
I am imagining, the property owner is free to let Annie stay, but only if he 
also accepts an individual obligation to ensure that Annie gets what she 
needs to become autonomous. Obviously it would also be permissible for 
charitable organizations to take on such responsibilities. It might turn out 
that Annie, and all those similarly situated, would end up getting their needs 
met due to the voluntary charity of the libertarian state’s citizens. In such a 
happy scenario, Hassoun would have little to criticize. Of course, the happy 
scenario probably would not be realized. So, if no one agrees to help Annie 
meet her needs, under the agreement that forms part of the constitution, 
no one is allowed to let Annie stay on his property. With no place in which 
she can legally stay, Annie would effectively be expelled from the libertarian 
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state. The result of the agreement will be that all potentially autonomous 
persons who remain in the libertarian state will receive what they need to 
become autonomous. No residents will any longer be in a position to claim 
libertarian welfare rights against the state.
This reply to Hassoun’s argument depends on the fact that premise 2 does 
not explicitly address the possibility that some persons who are currently 
subjects of a state will not remain so. Once we notice this possibility, we 
would have to consider modifying premise 2 to read
(2*) For a coercive institution to be legitimate, it must ensure that those of 
its subjects who remain under its jurisdiction secure sufficient autonomy 
to autonomously consent to, or dissent from, its rules.
If Annie had a right to remain in the libertarian state, this modification would 
be of little significance. But the libertarians could arrange their institutions 
in such a way that, by their own standards, there is no place in the state’s 
territory where Annie has a moral right to be. Therefore, premise 2* does not 
entail the conclusion of the Legitimacy Argument. 5
Is this solution morally acceptable? I am sure that most readers will think 
that it is not. The thought of wretched Annie, waiting alone in the station for 
the train that will take her to an unknown and precarious future, is enough 
to inspire pity and compassion in most people, and as a result, the response 
that more is owed to her than she is getting. But if you had that intuition, 
would you have been attracted to natural rights libertarianism in the first 
place? The idea that it is permissible for all the property-owners in the society 
to agree to exclude Annie from their land, as a way of avoiding the obligation 
to meet her needs, seems so morally objectionable as to be outrageous. But 
it is objectionable in the same way, to the same extent, and for the same 
reasons, as the libertarian position itself.
4. CONCLUSION
The history of the twentieth century showed, to everyone willing to open their 
eyes and learn, that markets have many important benefits and advantages. 
Surely, though, the important truths in the libertarian position would be 
5. For this solution to be available, there must be someplace outside the libertarian state 
for Annie to go. That is, if libertarians adopt this solution, they must oppose a global government. 
Given their emphasis on the practical importance of decentralization and competition between 
jurisdictions, I doubt that libertarians will find this claim unpalatable. Note that, as a result, 
the constitutional solution defended here does not in any way undermine the appeal of the 
Autonomy Argument (45) as directed against noon-libertarian international institutions of 
global scope. I do not here consider the deeply problematic situation that would arise for the 
libertarians if other states refused to admit Annie.
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better expressed through a view that rests the justification of markets on those 
benefits and advantages. Surely we can recognize, and value, the enormously 
important good consequences of allowing individuals broad scope to make 
their own choices in economic matters, while also recognizing the failures 
and limitations of markets in some instances, and the need for prudential 
regulation. Surely we can recognize, and deplore, the depressing tendency 
for governments to make problems worse in trying to solve them, and to 
ignore the unintended consequences of their actions, while also recognizing 
that in cases of externality, asymmetric information and market failure, there 
is sometimes no alternative to government action. Surely a consequentialist 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of markets would be 
better than a libertarian one.
However convincing these claims may be, though, they do not fully 
address the theoretical motivations behind the natural rights libertarian 
position. That position must be shown to be unacceptable on its own terms. 
Hassoun has offered us a novel and very interesting way of trying to do so. 
I regret to say, however, that her argument seems unsuccessful to me. For 
all its promise, the Legitimacy Argument turns out to leave natural rights 
libertarianism just as strong as it was before.
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